We argue that peoples' concern for fairness may explain an unsolved puzzle in macroeconomics: the persistence of in ation. We extend a 1990 wage-contracting model of Bhaskar in which workers' disutility from being paid less than other workers exceeds their utility from being paid more. This model generates a continuum of equilibria over a range of wages and unemployment rates. If workers' expectations are based on the past behavior of wage growth, these beliefs will be self-ful lling, generating in ation persistence within, but not outside of, this range. Based on quarterly U.S. data over the period 1955-2000, we nd evidence that in ation is more persistent between unemployment rates of 4.7 and 6.5% than outside these bounds. (JEL: E31, E3, E5)
Introduction
In recent years a number of experimental studies have documented that peoples' concern for fairness affects their microeconomic behavior (see Fehr and Schmidt 2003 for an overview). Since other departures from standard assumptions about preferences have important aggregate implications (see Akerlof 2002 for a survey), it is worth asking whether that is also true of fairness.
In this paper we argue that concern for fairness may explain an unsolved puzzle in macroeconomics: the persistence of in ation. As rst pointed out by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , the standard aggregate supply schedule based on the forward-looking, overlapping contracts models of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983)-often called the New Keynesian-Phillips curve-predicts stickiness in prices, but not in in ation, in contrast to much available evidence. Moreover, Ball (1994) , Taylor (1999) , and Mankiw (2001) have pointed out further empirical failings of this model.
The search for an alternative model that is both theoretically and empirically satisfying has led to a number of different approaches, including the assumption of near-rational expectations (Roberts 1998; Ball 2000) , replacing the output gap with a proxy for marginal costs (Galṍ and Gertler 1999) , slow diffusion of information (Mankiw and Reis 2002) or limitations to agents' ability to absorb information (Woodford 2003 ); yet it seems fair to say that the profession is still looking for a satisfying alternative.
Our approach starts from the assumption, following Bhaskar (1990) , that workers are concerned about fair treatment, in the sense that they care disproportionately more about being paid less than other workers than they do about being paid more than other workers. When incorporated into a standard wagebargaining model, the result is a continuum of rational expectations equilibria, in the form of a range of wage growth rates for which each wage setter will aim for the same wage growth as set by the others. This range in wage growth rates translates into a continuum of equilibria for output levels.
In this situation we argue that wage setters' past behavior may work as an equilibrium selection device: among all the actions consistent with a possible equilibrium, agents expect other agents to play as they have played in the past. This focus on past actions can thus rationalize adaptive expectations, and therefore inertia in in ation, as a self-ful lling prophecy. Outside this range of equilibria, the labor market is suf ciently tight or slack that it dominates workers' concern for fair treatment, and the model collapses to Taylor's (1980) canonical formulation.
Our paper is related to McDonald and Sibly (2001) , who independently discuss the effects of monetary policy in a model with a range of equilibria based on customer markets and worker loss aversion relative to past real wages, and Lye, McDonald, and Sibly (2001) , where Phillips-curve like equations are derived based on an assumption of worker loss aversion. However, neither of these papers focuses on in ation persistence.
We confront the model with U.S. quarterly data for unemployment and CPI in ation for the period 1955-2000. The results are generally favorable. Consistent with our theory and previous evidence, we nd that in ation is highly persistent, and that the relationship between in ation and unemployment is much noisier than standard theory would suggest. More importantly, the results concerning the novel predictions are also promising: we nd that in ation seems less persistent outside a set of "bounds" for the unemployment rate, though the effects are stronger for low levels of unemployment than for high levels.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and describes the resulting dynamics of in ation; Section 3 presents the empirical results; and Section 4 concludes.
The Model 2
We consider an economy consisting of K symmetric rms, each producing a different good. In each rm the workers bargain jointly with the rm over their wage. Then, each rm sets the price of its product. All agents are fully aware of how the economy works, so they can predict what other agents will do at the same and later stages of the model.
Each rm j has a constant returns to scale production function Y jt 5 N jt , where Y jt is output, N jt is employment, and the t subscript indicates the time period. Real pro ts of the rm are
where P jt is the price of output, X jt is the nominal wage in rm j, and
is the aggregate price level. Each rm faces a Dixit-Stiglitz style, constant elasticity, demand function:
where Y t is aggregate output. We now turn to the payoff function of the workers. Following Bhaskar (1990) we assume that workers are concerned with fair treatment. They resent being treated worse than identical workers elsewhere, in the sense that their dissatisfaction from being paid less than identical workers in other rms is greater than their bene t from being paid more. Formally, their utility functions are nondifferentiable at the wage level of other workers, so that the left-hand derivative is greater than the right-hand derivative.
There is considerable empirical support for an assumption of this kind. First, several experimental studies (including Austin, McGinn, and Susmilch 1980 and Ordonez, Connolly, and Coughlan 2000) report asymmetric effects of 2. The model is a shortened version of Driscoll and Holden (2003) .
pay differences on levels of satisfaction. Second, several studies (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 1989; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Goeree and Holt 2000) report asymmetric aversion to inequity. Third, experiments on loss aversion, by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and others, indicate that the value function appears to be steeper for losses than for gains.
The payoff function of a representative worker is
where X Jt is the average wage of workers in the same group, X Gt is the average wage of workers in the other groups, and D jt is a dummy variable being one if X jt , X Jt and zero otherwise. The payoff is continuous in real and relative wages, and strictly increasing in the real wage. The key assumption is that the payoff is assumed to be nondifferentiable at the point where wages are equal to the wages of other workers in the same group, X jt 5 X Jt , so that the loss in payoff of a reduction in the relative wage is strictly greater than the gain in payoff of an increase in the relative wage. The nondifferentiability only applies to workers in the same group, which could re ect that workers in different groups are different, so that the notion of equal wages for identical workers does not apply to workers in other groups. Note, however, that allowing the comparison to workers in other groups to be nondifferentiable as well would strengthen our results. With the exception of the nondifferentiability assumption, the results are robust to plausible variations in preferences, as well as to other assumptions about the wage setting.
3
The rst-order condition of the pro t maximization problem implies P jt 5 mX jt , where m 5 h/(h 2 1) . 1. The indirect payoff function of the rm, as a function of the real wage and aggregate output is thus
Wage Setting
Wage setting takes place simultaneously in all rms. Each rm is small, so parties in a single rm are assumed to take the values of the aggregate variables X Jt , X t , P t and Y t as exogenous in the negotiations. However, the parties will take into consideration that employment is set to maximize pro ts, and thus depends on the wage level.
We assume that the outcome of wage negotiations is given by the Nash bargaining solution X jt 5 arg max V jt , where
(6) subject to P $ P 0 and V $ V 0 , and pro t maximization as implied by (5). As argued by Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) , the appropriate interpretation of the threat points of the parties depends on the force that ensures that the parties reach an agreement. We assume that if no agreement is reached (which will not happen in equilibrium), there is a risk that negotiations break down. Let V 0t 5 V 0 (Y t ) be the expected payoff of the workers in this event; higher aggregate output is associated with higher aggregate employment, and thus makes it easier for the workers to nd a new job, increasing the expected payoff for job losers. The expected payoff of the rm in the case of a breakdown of the negotiation is for simplicity set to zero. We base our explanation of the implications of the model on two diagrams. For comparison, rst consider the model when fairness considerations are ignored (setting F 5 0 in (4)), see Figure 1 . The model is then essentially that of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, p. 19), or Blanchard (2003, p. 132) , although they use employment rather than output on the horizontal axis. The upward-sloping wage curve represents the outcome of the wage bargain; workers receive higher real wages when output is high, since they have a stronger bargaining position. The horizontal curve represents the outcome of price setting; as there is constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of demand, the real wage is uniquely determined. The overall equilibrium, determining output Y * , is given by the intersection of the wage and price curves. However, when workers care about fair treatment, there is a range of wage levels for which the wage setters will match the wage set by other wage setters. This range is indicated by the two wage curves in Figure 2 . The upper wage curve represents the upper limit to the wage each wage setter is able to obtain, given the expectation that other wage setters set the same wage. The lower curve represents the corresponding lower limit to the wage each wage setter will set. Thus, for a given output, any wage between the two wage curves can be the outcome of wage setting in a symmetric equilibrium. Again, the overall equilibrium must be on the price curve; thus, the range between the two wage curves on the price curve (i. 
Overlapping Wage Contracts
Now consider an overlapping contracts version of the model: There are two groups, and each group set wages for two periods, one group in odd periods and the other in even periods, as in the standard Taylor model. Let x t denote the log wage set in period t, and D x t 5 x t 2 x t2 1 . As shown by Driscoll and Holden (2003) , the constraints derived from wage setting, as illustrated by the two wage curves in Figure 2 , can be rewritten as constraints on the nominal wage growth (y is log of output)
When there is a range of possible equilibria in wage setting, agents cannot deduce other agents' behavior logically from the assumption that they behave rationally. In this situation it seems reasonable to assume that agents base their beliefs regarding wage growth on the past behavior of wage growth. This basic premise is common to a variety of approaches to expectation formation. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) advocate adaptive learning as a selection mechanism in situations with multiple rational expectations equilibria. Experiments on games with a multiplicity of equilibria also show that agents learn from the past behavior of other agents (Ochs 1995) . Consider a stylized version of existing empirical wage equations
Assuming that agents have observed wage in ation to adhere to (9) in the past, it seems reasonable that they would expect wage in ation to follow (9) in the future also, as long as this is consistent with the rational expectations equilibrium of the model, that is, it satis es the constraints given by (7) and (8). In this case (9) would work as a focal point for wage-setting behavior. Given (9), y * is the unique long run equilibrium rate of output. Note however that y * is inherently expectations-based, suggesting that the relationship between output (or employment or unemployment) and in ation will be unstable if expectations change. This is consistent with the considerable imprecision in the estimates of the natural rate of unemployment found by Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) on U.S. data.
In Driscoll and Holden (2003) , we argue that as long as output and unemployment is within the bounds, wage growth and in ation is likely to be persistent as represented by (9). However, if the bounds bind, or are expected to bind in the future, in ation will not be determined by the persistent and adaptive behavior speci ed in equation (9), but will uctuate with changes in expected future in ation, caused, for example, by expected changes in future monetary policy. Empirically, we would consequently expect in ation to be less persistent outside the bounds. Furthermore, we would expect output to have a larger impact on in ation if one of the bounds bind, as output will affect in ation both directly via the output term in the bound, and via the expected future in ation term in the bound.
Empirical Speci cation
To test the predictions, we adopt a levels version of Staiger, Stock, and Watson's (1997) speci cation: 0 1 a 1 p t21 1 a 2 p t22 1 a 3 p t23 1 b 1 u t21 1 b 2 u t22 1 gZ t 1 , and Z represents a vector of proxies for aggregate supply shocks 4 (we invoke an Okun's Law relationship to replace output with unemployment). The interaction of the dummy variables with the in ation and unemployment terms above and below the bounds allows us to test the model's prediction that the short-run dynamics of in ation and unemployment differ for low and high levels of unemployment. The bounds are found using a structural break approach; we reestimate (10) for different values of the bounds and pick the speci cation yielding the highest value for the log-likelihood. Table 1 provides the main empirical results. The rst column of Table 1 reports the results of estimating (10) without any bounds. The coef cients on unemployment alternate in sign but do sum to 20.213, so that the Phillips curve is downward sloping, as one would hope. Also as expected, the coef cients on lagged in ation are all positive and sum to 1.004, implying in ation is persistent.
The next three columns report the results of imposing the bounds, endogenously determined by the method described above. The rst column reports the coef cients on output, in ation, and the supply shocks between the bounds; the next columns the additional effects below and above the bounds. We nd the bounds to be at 4.7 and 6.5%, which correspond to (approximately) the 30th and 70th percentiles of observed unemployment.
5 Note that the more elaborate speci cation allowing all coef cients to take different values outside the bounds, as predicted by our model, is supported by the data, as the restrictions that are involved by the regression without bounds (column 1) is rejected in a likelihood ratio test at the 1% level.
The third and fourth columns report the interaction terms describing how the coef cients change outside the bounds. First, note that the coef cients on the lagged in ation interaction terms are almost all negative-implying that in ation is less persistent both below and above the bounds, as predicted by our Note: In ation is measured by the (annualized) quarterly percent change in the seasonally adjusted CPI for all urban consumers. The unemployment rate is that for all civilians over age 16. "Food" is the relative PPI in ation rate for processed foods and feeds, and "Fuel" is the relative in ation rate for energy, both lagged one period. "Nixon" is a dummy for wage and price controls. I H and I L are dummy variables for periods when lagged unemployment is outside the bounds u H and u L described in the text. Thus, the total effect of the RHS variables below (above) the bound, is given by the sum of the coef cient between bounds and the coef cient below (above) bounds. * Denotes statistical signi cance at the 5% level. ** Denotes statistical signi cance at the 1% level.
model. Below the bounds, the interaction terms sum to 20.775 and above to 20.453, which are large in magnitude and statistically signi cant. Below the bounds, the interaction terms on unemployment sum to 21.378, implying that the Phillips curve is more steeply sloped, as predicted by our model. Above the bounds, however, the unemployment terms sum to 0.587, which is close in magnitude to the value of 0.608 estimated between the bounds, implying a nearly-at Phillips curve above the bound (although highly imprecisely determined), in contrast to the predictions of our model.
Conclusion
The use of preferences taken from behavioral economics has become commonplace in explaining various empirical puzzles in consumption and asset pricing. In this paper, we take a step towards applying such preferences to explain the empirical puzzle in the Phillips curve literature of in ation persistence. Specifically, following Bhaskar (1990) , we argue that workers, concerned with fairness, care disproportionately more about being paid less than other workers than they do about being paid more than other workers. This yields a range of equilibria for both wages and unemployment. As wage setters want to match the wage growth set by others, the behavior of wages in the recent past will be a natural starting point for expectations. Within the range, such beliefs will create a self-ful lling prophecy; and thus be consistent with rational expectations. These beliefs combine the attractive features of both adaptive and rational expectations; they are consistent with key facts on in ation, but do not imply that agents make systematic errors.
We estimate the model, including the bounds, on quarterly data for the United States over the period 1955-2000. We nd that the dynamics of the Phillips curve do change at unemployment rates below 4.7% and above 6.5%. As predicted by our model, in ation seems less persistent outside the bounds. The prediction that in ation is more sensitive to changes in unemployment outside the bounds receives mixed results: we nd stronger effects for low unemployment, but not for high unemployment.
